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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LICENSING BIOLOGY
TEACHERS IN CREATIONISM
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Historical Background
The constitutional provisions separating church and state have long
provided fertile ground for conflict resulting in often-bitter courtroom
battles. From the famous Scopes "monkey trials" of 1927 in which Clar-
ence Darrow eloquently argued for the teaching of Darwin's theory of
evolution in the public schools," through the decisions of the sixties, sev-
enties, and eighties banning prayer,2 the posting of the Ten Command-
ments,3 and similar practices, the conflict has finally come full circle, with
fundamentalist Christian groups now arguing that the Biblical account of
creation should be taught in public schools as scientific theory.4
The latest courtroom skirmishes have pitted fundamentalists against
evolutionists, with creationists attempting to force the public schools to
allow or require the teaching of creation-science as well as evolution.5 The
advocates of creation-science, or creationism, allege scientific support for
the Biblical version of creation and assert the relatively recent, sudden
creation of the earth and the life on it by a divine creator, the separate
and distinct ancestry of man and ape, and the existence of a worldwide
floor, which accounts for much of the earth's geology. Evolutionary theo-
rists, on the other hand, propose the gradual development of man and
other organisms from lower forms of life that slowly evolved in a largely
automatic and random process, without intervention by a divine being.6
In numerous attempts to bring creation-science into the classroom de-
spite the strictures of the first amendment, creationists have argued vari-
ously that creation-science is not religion but science,7 that teaching only
evolution is a violation of the free exercise of religion because it under-
mines the religious convictions of students who believe in creationism,8
and that teaching creation-science is necessary to offset the harmful ef-
1. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
2. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
3. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
4. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (Balanced Treat-
ment Act held to violate establishment clause of the first amendment).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1264 (quoting Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science
Act § 4, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1663 (Supp. 1981)).
7. Bird, Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public Schools: A Constitutional De-
fense Under the First Amendment, 9 N. Ky. L. REv. 159, 167-70 (1982).
8. Id. at 197.
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fects of teaching evolution.9 Evolutionists argue that teaching creationism
is simply religious instruction cloaked as science and, as such, violates the
free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment.10 In addi-
tion, many scientists argue that the content of science courses should be
determined by the scientific community objectively weighing scientific ev-
idence and not by religious sects or politicians catering to various interest
groups."
B. Biology Teacher Licensing Controversy
The most recent controversy, and one that has yet to enter the courts,
involves whether or not a state can, or should, license teachers to teach
biology when their training is in creation-science rather than evolution."2
Previous cases have dealt with the constitutionality of including creation-
science in the curriculum,' but not with the constitutionality of the i-
censing question. Licensing a biology teacher who has been trained in cre-
ationism rather than evolution raises four distinct issues under the first
amendment:
1. Does denial of licensing violate the teacher's free-exercise-of-reli-
gion rights?
2. Does denial of licensing violate the teacher's freedom-of-speech
rights?
3. Does licensing violate the establishment clause by establishing the
religion of creationism?
4. Does denial of licensing violate the establishment clause by estab-
lishing Secular Humanism as a religion?
C. Scope of Comment
This comment will analyze these issues in an attempt to predict their
treatment by the courts, under the general assumptions that the teacher
9. Id. at 204; see McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255.
10. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. Roark, A 'New Synthesis' in Evolution Leads Scientists to Ask When and How Life
Began, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 23, 1981, at 3-4.
12. In Virginia, the controversy has centered on whether the State Board of Education
should license graduates of Liberty Baptist College to teach biology in the public schools.
Because its graduates are trained in creationism and because evangelist and spiritual leader
of the college, Jerry Falwell, has said that Liberty Baptist professors will teach that evolu-
tion is "foolish ... invalid, . . . that the Bible account [of life origins] is true and all others
are not," many educators fear that graduates from the college will be teaching religion in-
stead of science in their biology classrooms. Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 19, 1982, at
B3, col. 1.
13. See infra notes 64-65, 87-99 and accompanying text.
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is seeking licensing to teach in public, not private, schools, and that the
teacher, because of his training in creationism, intends to teach a biology
course based on creation-science, with evolution taught, if at all, as a mi-
nor, invalid theory.14
II. DENIAL OF LICENSING AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. Free Exercise Balancing Test
The free exercise clause of the first amendment prohibits the state"
from passing laws regulating religious beliefs as such or from prohibiting
the free exercise of any religion. The fundamental requirement of any
free exercise claim is coercion by the state. 6 That is, the state must have
used its power to force or to attempt to force the individual not to prac-
tice his religion as he chooses. Without some show of force or coercion, no
free exercise violation can occur. This coercion must also result in a bur-
den on the individual's practice of a bona fide religion 17 by inhibiting that
practice or by requiring conduct contrary to the individual's religious con-
victions.18 Generally, the coercion takes the form of forcing the individual
to choose between his religious beliefs and some important governmental
benefit.'9 However, not all coercive burdens imposed by the government
violate the first aniendment. The coercive burden must also outweigh the
state's public interest in imposing that burden.2" Should the state interest
14. These assumptions comport with the original facts of the Liberty Baptist College situ-
ation before the objectives of the biology training program were altered in response to criti-
cism by the Virginia State Board of Education. See supra note 12.
15. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (first amendment applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment).
16. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423, 430 (1962).
17. "Bona fide" religion has been liberally construed by the courts and includes the free-
dom to practice no religion at all or to practice one not based on belief in a Supreme Being.
See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (definition of religion expanded to
include those not professing belief in Supreme Being and reaffirming protection of belief in
no religion at all); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 211-12, 68 N.E. 243, 247 (1903) (Chris-
tian Catholic Church, which believed in divine healing, recognized as religion).
18. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
19. E.g.,
The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her reli-
gion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a
choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine
imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
20. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state interest in compulsory school at-
tendance outweighed by burden of potential destruction of Amish faith); Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (government interest in military conscription outweighs religious
convictions based on particular war); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (possibility of
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be sufficiently compelling, the action does not violate the first amendment
despite the coercive burden it places on the individual.2" The result is a
balancing process by which the court weighs the burden on the individual
against the benefit to the state.
In a situation where a teacher trained in creationism is denied licensing
by the state, any possible free exercise violation must therefore be ana-
lyzed by balancing the burden on the teacher against the interest of the
state in denying licensing.
B. State Interest in License Denial
Although not absolute, the state does have a compelling interest in pro-
viding public education 22 and in disseminating knowledge developed by a
responsible academic community.23 In addition, the state has an interest
in the efficiency and productive operation of its public schools. 24 Crea-
tionism has frequently been characterized as unscientific and, as such, is
not generally accepted by the academic world as a scientific theory of the
earth's origins, but rather a religious belief founded in faith.2 5 Teaching
creationism would open the door to arguments that other non-traditional
theories of man's origin must also be taught, and the ensuing disruption
fraudulent unemployment claims insufficient state interest to deny unemployment compen-
sation to individual discharged because of refusal for religious reasons to work on Saturday).
21. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indus. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19
(1981) (state interest in preventing unemployment is insufficiently compelling to justify free
exercise burden); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (interest in
maintaining uniform day of rest); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (interest in
enforcing child labor laws); Biklen v. Board of Educ., 333 F. Supp. 902, 908-09 (N.D.N.Y.
1971), aff'd mem., 406 U.S. 951 (1972) (state interest in loyalty oath outweighs teacher's free
exercise rights); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903) (interest in protecting
lives and health of children outweighs parent's belief in divine healing).
22. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp.,
631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
23. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
105, 107 (1968); Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 18-20, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 81-83 (1975), appeal dismissed, 425 U.S. 908, reh'g
denied, 425 U.S. 1000 (1976).
24. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1971) (policy prohibit-
ing distribution of potentially disruptive material on school grounds does not violate free
expression); Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594, 597-98 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
948 (1971) (prohibition on wearing button soliciting participation in anti-war demonstration
does not deny right of free speech); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (state interest in possible disruption of school caused by
students wearing black anti-war armbands insufficient to outweigh burden on freedom of
expression).
25. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Lines, Scien-
tific Creationism in the Classroom: A Constitutional Dilemma, 28 Loy. L. REv. 35, 53
(1982) ("To be constitutional, a nonevolutionary theory must be subjected to the same criti-
cal inquiry that any scientific theory should receive."). But see Bird, supra note 7, at 167-70.
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of the educational process would jeopardize the efficiency and effective-
ness of the public education system.2" In addition, teaching such theories
might well violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. For
example, in Daniels v. Waters,27 the Sixth Circuit held a Tennessee stat-
ute to violate the establishment clause because it required all textbooks
expressing an opinion on the origin of man to devote "commensurate at-
tention to, and an equal amount of emphasis on" the Biblical account of
creation as well as other non-evolutionary theories.28 By denying licensing
to teachers trained primarily in creationism, the state is protecting its
interest in providing an education in generally accepted scientific theories
rather than religious dogma. In this way, the state restricts itself to teach-
ing secular matters and avoids the potential disruptions which would oc-
cur if the state were required to teach all theories of origin whether
founded in science or religious belief.29
Such a disruption would be justified only if the burden on free exercise
is substantial enough to outweigh it. Although he does not consider the
burden on teachers, at least one author feels that the burden on students
is never substantial enough merely because evolution and not creationism
is taught. Because students are not pressured to abandon their creationist
beliefs, no coercion exists even though they may learn that the academic
community does not regard their beliefs as science. 30 Whether the state's
interest in providing a sound education outweighs the free exercise bur-
den on the teacher has not yet been decided. Before making this decision,
a court would also have to examine the extent to which the license denial
actually burdens the teacher.
C. Previous Burdens on Free Exercise Rights
Previous burdens which have been held to outweigh the state's interest
have been quite substantial. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,31 an exemption for
compulsory school attendance beyond the eighth grade was granted to an
Amish family because attendance would have made training their chil-
dren in their faith impossible.3 2 The Supreme Court found this interfer-
ence with their free exercise of religious belief to be a burden substantial
enough to outweigh the state's interest in compulsory education, espe-
cially since the Amish community would continue to provide an education
26. Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 969 (1974) (action to enjoin teaching of evolution denied).
27. 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975).
28. Id. at 487.
29. Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 486 F.2d 137.
30. Lines, supra note 25, at 53; see also Note, Evolution, Creationism and the Religion
Clauses, 46 ALB. L. REv. 897, 910-11 (1982).
31. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
32. Id. at 219.
8491983]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
in the form of vocational training in their agricultural community.3 3 The
Court recognized that the situation in Yoder was unusual and that this
burden was not likely to occur often; it stated that the substantiality of
the claimed burden was "one that probably few other religious groups or
sects could make."'3' Similarly in West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette,3 a substantial burden was found to exist in requiring a
student to salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance under threat
of expulsion where the student, a Jehovah's Witness, considered such
conduct to be contrary to writings in Exodus. 6 State interest in coercing
"national unity" was insufficiently compelling to overcome that burden.37
Although Barnette discusses many unacceptable burdens in terms of all
first amendment freedoms, including free exercise, the decision is prima-
rily grounded in the free speech clause. However, Justices Black and
Douglas concurred on free exercise grounds as well.38
On the other hand, the coercive burden on free exercise where students
were voluntarily released from school during the school day to attend reli-
gious instruction elsewhere did not constitute a sufficient burden to make
the "release time" program unconstitutional.3 9 Likewise, the burden on
students taught only the theory of evolution and not creationism was held
not to state a claim upon which relief could be granted in Wright v.
Houston Independent School District.40 A federal court decided that the
proposed solutions were more onerous on the school district than was the
burden on free exercise.41 In Wright, the articulated state interests were
quite similar to those in the teacher licensing question, although the bur-
dened parties were students, not teachers.
33. Id. at 223-26. The Court recognized, "[N]ot only do the Amish accept the necessity
for formal schooling through the eighth grade level, but continue to provide what has been
characterized by the undisputed testimony of expert educators as an 'ideal vocational edu-
cation .... ."' Id. at 224.
34. Id. at 236.
35. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
36. "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image . . . thou shalt not bow down
thyself to them, nor serve them. . . ." Exodus 20:4-5. Because the defendants considered
the flag to be an "image," they refused to salute it. 319 U.S. at 629.
37. 319 U.S. at 639-41. Although the Court felt that national unity was an admirable goal,
the burden on first amendment freedoms was an impermissible method of achieving it in
the absence of "grave and immediate danger." Id. at 639.
38. Id. at 643-44 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
39. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952). Zorach was decided on both free exercise
and establishment grounds and held that no coercion within the meaning of either first
amendment religion clause existed.
40. 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), af'd, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 969 (1974).
41. 366 F. Supp. at 1211. The proposed solutions were either the exclusion of the students
from study of evolution or the presentation of all theories of the origin of life.
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D. Burden on Teachers Resulting From License Denial
The teacher who is denied a license is burdened to the extent that he is
denied the opportunity to teach in the public schools. This burden is co-
ercive because it forces the teacher to choose between the benefit of pub-
lic employment and the practice of his religious beliefs.42 Should this bur-
den on the individual outweigh the state's interest in not allowing
creationism to be taught,43 denial of licensing would violate the free exer-
cise clause. However, it is possible that little burden on free exercise actu-
ally exists.
Early free exercise cases differentiated between the freedom to believe
and the freedom to act, declaring the former to be absolute but the latter
restricted.44 Denial of licensing does not hinder the teacher's freedom to
believe in creationism but only his freedom to act on that belief (i.e., to
teach in the public schools). Unless the denial of a license proscribes con-
duct in which the teacher is otherwise entitled to engage (i.e., public em-
ployment as a teacher), no burden on the teacher results from the license
denial.45
It has been held that the state has broad discretion in choosing the
curriculum of its schools, as long as its choice does not violate the Consti-
tution.46 The stat6 also has the right to establish qualifications for its
teaching positions within constitutional limits.47 On the other hand, a
teacher does not appear to have a constitutional right to public employ-
ment which is denied merely because the state does not hire him to
teach.48 However, the state cannot refuse to hire an individual for a con-
stitutionally impermissible reason.49 Therefore, it could not refuse to em-
42. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 617 (1978) (statute denying ministers or priests the right
to serve as delegates to state constitutional convention is coercive because of forced choice
between religion and public rights).
43. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
44. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878).
45. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
46. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968).
47. Freeman v. Gould, 405 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 1969).
48. "[T]o refuse ... to engage the professional services of any person is in no sense a
denial of the constitutional right of that person to follow his chosen profession." Seattle
High School Chapter No. 200, Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Sharples, 159 Wash. 424, , 239
P. 994, 996 (1930). But cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (no state shall deprive a
person of liberty without due process of law; "liberty" includes right of individual to engage
in any of the common occupations of life). However, Meyer also implies such deprivation
will be allowed if it bears some "reasonable relation" to an acceptable state purpose. Fur-
thermore, the act which the Court struck down would have deprived the teacher of employ-
ment in any school, public or private, and not simply of government employment.
49. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (interest in government efficiency insufficient to
support patronage dismissal practice); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)
(political association alone is insufficient ground for denying public employment); Hysong v.
1983]
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ploy a teacher merely because he was trained in creationism. However, it
does appear that as long as the state may constitutionally exclude crea-
tionism from its curriculum,50 as apparently it can,51 and as long as the
teacher is not otherwise qualified to teach additional subjects such as
evolution, the teacher has no right to expect himself to be eligible for the
benefit of public employment as a teacher. Because he is not otherwise
qualified for this employment, denial of a license does not create a free
exercise burden, but merely carries out the legitimate policy of the state
not to teach creationism and to hire only teachers who are qualified in the
curriculum lawfully chosen by the state.
Another possible burden on the teacher is that forcing a teacher with
creationism beliefs to teach only evolution in order to obtain public
school employment undermines the religious beliefs of that teacher. Al-
though that may indeed be the result, the courts have not been swayed by
similar arguments in analogous situations. For instance, in Epperson v.
Arkansas5 2 the Supreme Court stated that "the state has no legitimate
interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to
them."53 Likewise, in Crowley v. Smithsonian Institution,54 a federal dis-
trict court refused to hold that proposed. museum exhibits on evolution
violated the free exercise clause by forcing plaintiffs to choose between
their right to attend the museum and their right to exercise their religious
beliefs. The court did not find the burden imposed on plaintiffs substan-
tial enough to outweigh the compelling state interest in "diffusing [scien-
tific] knowledge among men."5 5 The court also denied any state responsi-
bility to protect individuals from information incompatible with their
religious beliefs.
Even if some burden on the teacher's free exercise does exist, it does
not appear to be sufficient to outweigh the state's interest in light of the
foregoing, and thus would not be an unconstitutional burden. In addition,
if creationism is determined to be impermissibly religious under the es-
tablishment clause, the court would probably consider both the burden
on students' free exercise rights resulting from the licensing and the pos-
School Dist. of Gallitzin Borough, 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894) (interest in avoiding secta-
rian instruction in public school is insufficient basis for forbidding nuns employed as public
school teachers from wearing habits and insignia of religious order).
50. A complete discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this comment. See Lines,
supra note 25; Treiman, Religion in the Public Schools, 9 N. Ky. L. REv. 229 (1982).
51. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
52. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
53. 393 U.S. at 107 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952)).
54. 462 F. Supp. 725 (D.D.C. 1978), aft'd, 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Crowley,
plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that a Smithsonian exhibit on evolution violated their free
exercise rights by forcing them "either to violate their religious beliefs by entering the Mu-
seum or forsake their right of access to public property," 462 F. Supp. at 727, because the
exhibit presented evolution as "the only credible theory of the origin of life. "id. at 725.
55. Id. at 727.
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sible violation of the establishment clause itself which may result from
the licensing.
III. DENIAL OF LICENSING AND THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE
A. Development of the Free Speech Test
The denial of licensing to a teacher trained in creation-science also
raises the issue of possible violation of the freedom of speech clause. Al-
though the courts have traditionally been sympathetic to state efforts to
control the content of the public school curriculum and to screen out
ideas considered undesirable, there is evidence of a shift in judicial atti-
tude toward encouraging student exposure to a broad variety of view-
points and ideas.56 For example, in Mailloux v. Kiley,57 the dismissal of a
teacher for using a teaching method which was relevant but lacked the
preponderant support of the educational community was held to violate
"'vital First Amendment rights,' "58 where the teacher had not first been
given notice that his method was proscribed. The court said, "We do not
confine academic freedom to conventional teachers or to those who can
get a majority vote from their colleagues. '59
However, freedom of speech has never been absolute, and the public
school teacher's right to this freedom inside the classroom is subject to
closer scrutiny than his right outside it.60 For instance, lower courts have
held that in-class freedom of speech does not extend to teaching material
unrelated to approved subject matter61 or to language which is patently
offensive by community standards.6 2 However, they have upheld the right
of a teacher to use a teaching method which is not necessary to instruct
the class fully on a subject, but which is related to that subject and is
arguably a proper method. 3 The closest the Supreme Court has come to
discussing the teacher's free speech rights within the public school class-
room occurred in Epperson v. Arkansas." In Epperson, the Court de-
56. Note, Free Speech Rights of Public School Teachers: A Proposed Balancing Test, 30
CLEV. ST. L. R.v. 673, 679-80 (1981).
57. 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. 1971), af'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
58. 323 F. Supp. at 1392 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604
(1967)).
59. 323 F. Supp. at 1391.
60. Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973)
(academic freedom is not "a license for uncontrolled expression at variance with established
curricular contents .... ).
61. Ahem v. Board of Educ., 329 F. Supp. 1391 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 399 (8th
Cir. 1972).
62. Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974).
63. Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1391 (D. Mass. 1971), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st
Cir. 1971) (slang word for sexual intercourse written on blackboard by teacher to illustrate
discussion of taboo words).
64. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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clared an anti-evolution statute unconstitutional and allowed the plaintiff
to include material on evolution in her biology class. However, the case
was decided on freedom of religion grounds, and although it presented
the Court with a clear opportunity to discuss free speech within the class-
room, the Court expressly declined to do so."
In determining whether the state is entitled to suppress freedom of ex-
pression, the courts have applied the test used by the Supreme Court in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District." In
Tinker, a prohibition on students wearing black armbands to school in
disapproval of the Vietnam hostilities was declared an unconstitutional
burden on free expression of opinion because it was not "necessary to
avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline
. ... 6, In Widmar v. Vincent,68 when a student religious group was de-
nied use of college facilities generally available for residential student use,
the test for an acceptable burden was one that "is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and . . . is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end." 9 The Court noted, however, that college students "are less impres-
sionable than younger students"7 0 ; the logical inference is that a stricter
standard might be imposed with minors. Even so, it can be inferred that
the Court is using a two-prong test to determine when free speech rights
may be suppressed, because avoiding Tinker's "substantial interference
with schoolwork" test can be characterized as a compelling state inter-
est.7 1 The test seems to require both a compelling state interest and the
least restrictive means available to advance that interest.
B. Application of the Free Speech Test
1. Compelling State Interest
To apply this test to the teacher licensing situation, it must be deter-
mined whether denial of a teacher's license is the least restrictive means
to achieve a compelling state interest. The first step in the inquiry is to
determine if the state has a compelling interest that is served by the de-
nial of licensing. As discussed earlier, the state does have an interest in
65. Id. at 104-05.
66. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
67. Id. at 511.
68. 454 U.S. 263 (1981), af'g Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980).
69. Id. at 270. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972) (denial of recognition of
student group was invalid under first amendment where college failed to show appropriate-
ness of the action).
70. 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14. See also Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980)
(holding that the higher degree of supervision required by high school students poses a
greater risk of government entanglement in religion than where college students are
concerned).
71. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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maintainng the educational integrity of its school system as well as in
protecting the system from the substantial disruption and interference
that could result from adjusting curricula to the demands of numerous
religious and other self-interest groups.7 2 However, it is not sufficient
merely that the state have a legitimate interest, but it "must be para-
mount, one of vital importance, and the burden is on the government to
show [it] . ... ,73 In Elrod v. Burns, 4 the argument that patronage dis-
missals were necessary to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of a
government agency was not a sufficiently compelling state interest to
overcome the burden on the individual's first amendment rights.
2. Least Restrictive Means
Not only must the state's interest be sufficiently compelling, but the
method selected to further that interest must be narrowed to the least
restrictive means available.7 5 Thus, the license denial must be the least
restrictive means available to advance the state's interest in protecting
the public schools. Where the license is denied to a teacher of creationism
who is not otherwise qualified to teach evolution, it may well be the least
restrictive means to prevent unauthorized and possibly unconstitutional
material from entering the biology curriculum. However, when the license
is denied to one who is also qualified to teach evolution and other tradi-
tional materials, the least restrictive means may be not a license denial,
but perhaps a state-approved lesson plan and monitoring of the material
being taught.
Although the state has a right to set conditions for employment, these
conditions may not be constitutionally impermissible. 7 In addition, the
state has a right to determine, within constitutional limits, the subjects to
be taught in its schools." Thus, the state may have the right to require a
teacher to be trained in evolutionary theory and to teach only evolution-
ary theory, but it may not have the right to refuse to hire a teacher
merely because he is trained in creationism as well, even though the state
fears he will attempt to indoctrinate students in his belief.7 8 Because
there are less restrictive means of advancing the admittedly compelling
interest, such a burden on the teacher's free speech rights may not be
allowed.
72. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
73. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976).
74. 427 U.S. 347.
75. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. at 270.
76. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
78. Whether the licensed biology teacher has a right to introduce creation-science into his
biology course is beyond the scope of this comment. See generally McLean v. Arkansas Bd.
of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Lines, supra note 25; Treinan, supra note 50.
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IV. LICENSING CREATIONISM-TRAINED TEACHERS AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. Development of the Establishment Clause Test
The first amendment has long been held to proscribe any religious ac-
tivity by the state.79 Indeed, it has been said that the establishment
clause "was intended to erect a wall of separation between Church and
State." 80 In Everson v. Board of Education,"' the Court held the amend-
ment to mean that the state must be entirely neutral in matters of reli-
gion, that it could neither show favoritism toward religions nor handicap
them. In Zorach v. Clauson,8s the Court said "so far as interference with
the 'free exercise' of religion and an 'establishment' of religion are con-
cerned, the separation must be complete and unequivocal.8 s3
Over the years, the Court has consistently broadened its interpretation
of the establishment clause84 through such holdings as the unconstitu-
tionality of using public school buildings after hours for religious instruc-
tion of students 5 and of reciting a non-denominational prayer in school
each day."6 The cases with the most similarity to the teacher licensing
situation are those in which the courts have invalidated certain laws re-
specting the curriculum offered by the public schools. The first laws chal-
lenged were the "monkey laws" or anti-evolution statutes proscribing
teaching of evolutionary theory. In 1968, the Supreme Court finally held
these laws unconstitutional in Epperson v. Arkansas,sT on grounds that
the intent of the legislature had been to eliminate evolutionary theory
from the curriculum because of objections by fundamentalist Christians.
Although Epperson does not expressly exclude creationism from the cur-
riculum, its logical extension forbids the state to adjust its science courses
for reasons supportive of religious beliefs.8 The Epperson court applied
79. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
80. 8 T. JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (H. Washington ed. 1853)
("I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which de-
clared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and
State."). See also Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
81. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
82. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
83. Id. at 312. However, Zorach also stands for the fact that some state "accommodation"
of religion is not only permissible but also necessary in order for free exercise of belief to
exist. Id.
84. "[Because] it forbade all laws respecting an establishment of religion .... [t]his
Court has given the Amendment a 'broad interpretation .. ' McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 421-22 (1960).
85. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
86. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
87. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
88. "[T]he First Amendment does not permit the state to require that teaching ... be
[Vol. 17:845
LICENSING BIOLOGY TEACHERS
the test for establishment clause constitutionality, part of which was first
articulated in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp:9 "[T]o
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a sec-
ular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion." 90 To this, Lemon v. Kurtzman1 added the requirement
that the state action must avoid excessive government entanglement with
religion.92
B. Application of the Establishment Clause Test
Recently, in McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education,93 a district court
applied the three-prong test to invalidate an Arkansas law requiring "bal-
anced treatment" in the public school curriculum for creationism and
evolution. The court found that the law requiring teaching of creationism
violated all three prongs of the Supreme Court's test. Because the court
found that creationism lacked the "essential characteristics of science, ' '9
4
and was inspired by a literal reading of the Book of Genesis, it decided
that creationism was not science, but religion masquerading as science.9 5
When the state presented no legitimate educational purpose for the bal-
anced treatment act, the court found that the act failed the first prong of
the test by its lack of a clearly secular legislative purpose." That the pri-
mary and, indeed, the only effect of the act was to advance religion was
the logical conclusion once the court found that "creation-science has no
scientific merit or educational value as science . . . . 9 The court also
found the excessive-entanglement prong violated by the pervasive pres-
ence of religious concepts in creation-science texts and by the resulting
need to screen texts and monitor classroom discussion for impermissible
religious instruction.98
It would thus appear that any establishment clause challenge to a state
tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma." Id. at 106.
89. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
90. Id. at 222.
91. 403 U.S. 602 (1970).
92. Id. at 612.13.
93. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
94. Id. at 1267. The court said the following are the essential characteristics of science: (1)
it is guided by natural law; (2) it has to be explained by reference to natural law; (3) it is
testable against the empirical world; (4) its conclusions are tentative, rather than the final
word; and (5) it is falsiflable.
95. A case invalidating a similar statute in Louisiana was argued on first amendment
grounds but decided on state constitutional grounds by a federal district court. Aguillard v.
Louisiana Dep't of Educ., No. CA 81-4787 (E.D. La. filed Dec. 3, 1981). The case is currently
being appealed. Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1663 to -1670 (Cum. Supp. 1983) with LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-.7 (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
96. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1264.
97. Id. at 1272.
98. Id.
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decision to license teachers trained in creationism would have to pass this
three-prong test. Whether or not it could do so would depend on the spe-
cific factual situation. It seems clear that if creationism is considered a
religious belief rather than a scientific theory, then the permissibility of
licensing is unlikely. Even if a valid secular purpose for the licensing
could be shown, the primary effect would be to infuse religious concepts
into the biology curriculum should the teachers actually discuss creation-
ism in their classes. Were the state to license the teachers and then at-
tempt to regulate the extent to which creationism enters the standard
biology course, or to monitor biology courses to ensure that no creation-
ism is taught, the result would be an excessive governmental entangle-
ment with religion under the McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education
reasoning. 9
However, should creation-science proponents succeed in designing a
course based on creationism that could be accepted by the courts as sci-
ence and not as religious dogma, the state licensing of teachers to teach
such a course could no longer be argued to establish a religion, and the
establishment clause would no longer be a barrier to licensing.
V. DENIAL OF LICENSING AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. Establishment Clause Ban on Religious Preferences
The establishment clause has long been held not only to prohibit gov-
ernment action preferring one religion over another or all religions over
none, but also to proscribe conduct preferring no religion to religion.00
Thus in Everson v. Board of Education,0 1 the Court held that the first
amendment "requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups
of religious believers and non-believers ... ."12 Even in his dissent, Jus-
tice Jackson agreed that the public schools were "organized on the pre-
mise that secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching so
that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also
maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to religion.'' 3 Proponents of cre-
ation-science argue that teaching of evolutionary theory and not creation-
ism amounts to the state establishing the religion of Secular Human-
ism.104 To analyze the accuracy of this allegation in the context of teacher
99. For an argument that the court misapplied the excessive entanglement test, see Lines,
supra note 25, at 50-51.
100. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,
492-93 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442-43 (1960); Illinois ex rel McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947).
101. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
102. Id. at 18.
103. Id. at 23-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
104. Treiman, supra note 50, at 233.
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licensing, we must first examine whether the denial of licenses in crea-
tionism that results in the teaching of only evolutionary theory is
equivalent to preferring the religion of Secular Humanism to creationism.
If it is, we must then examine whether this licensing preference passes or
fails the three-prong establishment clause test.
B. Evolutionary Theory as Secular Humanism
The question of whether evolutionary theory is equivalent to Secular
Humanism was considered in Crowley v. Smithsonian Institution. 5 In
Crowley, the plaintiffs alleged that the museum's exhibitions on the the-
ory of evolution violated the religious neutrality required by the first
amendment. In holding there was no violation, the court found that evo-
lutionary theory cannot be equated with Secular Humanism simply be-
cause the religious philosophy of Secular Humanism espouses evolution
as one of its many tenets.106 The court's rationale was prompted by Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland,107 where the Supreme Court stated, "[T]he 'Estab-
lishment' Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct
whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions."108 Because evolutionary theory happens to
be a part of the Secular Humanism doctrine,109 it is unlikely that teaching
evolution or, by extension, denial of a license to teach creationism, will be
construed by the courts as establishing Secular Humanism in violation of
the first amendment. Indeed, that the teaching of evolution is valid under
the first amendment would seem to have been settled by default in Ep-
person and subsequent cases.110
However, even if evolution is considered to have some religious charac-
teristics,'1 ' it does not automatically follow that denial of a teacher's li-
105. 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
106. 636 F.2d at 742-43. Secular Humanism also advocates such causes as the right to
divorce, birth control, universal education, and a world community, none of which is consid-
ered a part of the theory of evolution. Id. at 740 n.3.
107. 366 U.S. 420 (1960).
108. Id. at 442. In addition, the Court has expressed concern over constitutional issues
such as censorship and excessive entanglement when the states, and not the court, decide
what is or is not religious. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 n.11 (1981);
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87-88 (1944).
109. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (anti-evolution statute violates
first amendment); McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982);
Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), afl'd, 486 F.2d
137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
111. Some creationists claim that evolution is a "'non-observable... phenomenon which
can neither be proven nor verified by the scientific method. . . ."' and thus is not true
science but a "'faith position'" and, therefore, itself a religion. Crowley v. Smithsonian
Inst., 636 F.2d 738, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting testimony of witnesses). But, for argu-
ments that neither evolution nor creation-science should be considered a religion, see Bird,
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cense in creationism establishes evolution as a religion.
C. Application of the Establishment Clause Test
Assuming that license denial means that only evolution will be taught
in the public schools, it is still necessary to apply the three-prong test to
determine if a violation of the establishment clause exists. To apply the
test requires factual analysis based on the specific situation as it arises,
but a general line of inquiry can be established. For instance, it will be
necessary to determine the purpose of the license denial in order to de-
cide whether that purpose is clearly secular. Superficially at least, this
must be so because the purpose of such a denial would probably be to
prevent teaching of creationism in the public schools. This premise, in
turn, will initiate an analysis of whether creationism is religion or science.
If it is science, it is difficult to see how denial of a license in a secular
subject could establish still another subject as a religion or even be rele-
vant to its establishment in any way. If it is religion, as the McLean court
determined it was, then the purpose and primary effect of the license de-
nial still appear valid because denial would be maintaining the "wall of
separation" between religion and the public schools.
The argument that licensing teachers to teach the religion of creation-
ism is necessary to offset or neutralize the teaching of the "religion" of
evolution fails because the appropriate remedy would be to stop licensing
teachers in evolution, and not to license someone to teach additional con-
stitutionally impermissible material." 2 Neither is it likely that the license
denial would violate the excessive-entanglements prong because the ac-
tion seems to be designed to prevent any state entanglement with religion
in the public schools by obviating the need for monitoring classroom in-
struction or textbooks for religious content.1 3 Thus, it seems unlikely
that a court will consider the denial of licensing to teachers trained in
creationism to be the establishment of a religion.
VI. CONCLUSION
It seems clear that any denial of licensing to biology teachers trained in
creationism would have to pass the free-exercise balancing test as well as
supra note 8, at 170.
112. The McLean court stated that
Assuming for the purposes of argument, however, that evolution is a religion or reli-
gious tenet, the remedy is to stop the teaching of evolution; not establish another
religion in opposition to it. Yet it is clearly established in the case law, and perhaps
also in common sense, that evolution is not a religion and that teaching evolution
does not violate the Establishment Clause ....
McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1274 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
113. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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the free-speech test requiring use of the least restrictive means to ad-
vance a compelling state interest in order to be constitutional under the
first amendment. In addition, the denial could not be considered to estab-
lish Secular Humanism as a religion or to prefer no religion to religion in
general. From the foregoing analysis, it appears unlikely that the burden
on a teacher's free exercise of religion would be considered sufficient to
outweigh the state's interest in denying licensing as long as creationism is
considered religious doctrine by the courts. Neither are the courts likely
to equate teaching of evolution with establishing Secular Humanism as a
religion or preferring non-religion to religion and, therefore, denial of li-
censing seems safe from establishment clause challenge. The area in
which licensing denial is most likely to be held unconstitutional is that of
free speech because of the "least restrictive alternative" requirement.
Even this possibility is unlikely as long as creation-science is considered
impermissibly religious by the courts. However, if denial of licensing to
the teachers is unconstitutional, licensing may be equally unconstitu-
tional. As the three-prong test is now applied, and as long as creationism
is held to contain religious concepts rather than pure scientific theory,
licensing is almost certain to violate the establishment clause.11 '
In the end, the key to the constitutionality of the licensing questions is
inextricably entangled in the constitutionality of creation-science itself in
the public school curriculum. The answers depend in large measure on
whether the courts decide that creation-science infuses religious dogma
into biology classes or whether creationism, like evolution, is simply an-
other scientific theory of life's origins.
Benjamin W. Emerson
114. The Liberty Baptist College licensing controversy in Virginia was temporarily
defused before it could reach the courts by the granting of a one-year provisional licensing
approval after the college agreed to stop teaching creationism as a biology course and to
stop counting it toward the required hours for a biology education major. Richmond News
Leader, Dec. 10, 1982, at 19, col. 1. However, it is submitted that the proposed monitoring
by the state of college biology classes to ensure absence of religious dogma violates the ex-
cessive entanglement prong of the establishment clause test as applied by the McLean
court.
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